登陆注册
19466800000241

第241章 THE SIXTH ENNEAD(33)

those affections of Soul which are related to body.On the contrary, Soul, conceived apart from affection and Reason-Principle, we have restored to its origin, leaving in the lower realm no substance which is in any sense Intellectual.

17.This procedure, if approved, will entail a distinction between psychic and bodily qualities, the latter belonging specifically to body.

If we decide to refer all souls to the higher, we are still at liberty to perform for Sensible qualities a division founded upon the senses themselves- the eyes, the ears, touch, taste, smell; and if we are to look for further differences, colours may be subdivided according to varieties of vision, sounds according to varieties of hearing, and so with the other senses: sounds may also be classified qualitatively as sweet, harsh, soft.

Here a difficulty may be raised: we divide the varieties of Substance and their functions and activities, fair or foul or indeed of any kind whatsoever, on the basis of Quality, Quantity rarely, if ever, entering into the differences which produce species; Quantity, again, we divide in accordance with qualities of its own: how then are we to divide Quality itself into species? what differences are we to employ, and from what genus shall we take them? To take them from Quality itself would be no less absurd than setting up substances as differences of substances.

How, then, are we to distinguish black from white? how differentiate colours in general from tastes and tangible qualities?

By the variety of sense-organs? Then there will be no difference in the objects themselves.

But, waiving this objection, how deal with qualities perceived by the same sense-organ? We may be told that some colours integrate, others disintegrate the vision, that some tastes integrate, others disintegrate the tongue: we reply that, first, it is the actual experiences [of colour and taste, and not the sense-organs] that we are discussing and it is to these that the notions of integration and disintegration must be applied; secondly, a means of differentiating these experiences has not been offered.

It may be suggested that we divide them by their powers, and this suggestion is so far reasonable that we may well agree to divide the non-sensuous qualities, the sciences for example, on this basis; but we see no reason for resorting to their effects for the division of qualities sensuous.Even if we divide the sciences by their powers, founding our division of their processes upon the faculties of the mind, we can only grasp their differences in a rational manner if we look not only to their subject-matter but also to their Reason-Principles.

But, granted that we may divide the arts by their Reason-Principles and theorems, this method will hardly apply to embodied qualities.Even in the arts themselves an explanation would be required for the differences between the Reason-Principles themselves.Besides, we have no difficulty in seeing that white differs from black; to account for this difference is the purpose of our enquiry.

18.These problems at any rate all serve to show that, while in general it is necessary to look for differences by which to separate things from each other, to hunt for differences of the differences themselves is both futile and irrational.We cannot have substances of substances, quantities of quantities, qualities of qualities, differences of differences; differences must, where possible, be found outside the genus, in creative powers and the like: but where no such criteria are present, as in distinguishing dark-green from pale-green, both being regarded as derived from white and black, what expedient may be suggested?

Sense-perception and intelligence may be trusted to indicate diversity but not to explain it: explanation is outside the province of sense-perception, whose function is merely to produce a variety of information; while, as for intelligence, it works exclusively with intuitions and never resorts to explanations to justify them;there is in the movements of intelligence a diversity which separates one object from another, making further differentiation unnecessary.

Do all qualities constitute differentiae, or not? Granted that whiteness and colours in general and the qualities dependent upon touch and taste can, even while they remain species [of Quality], become differentiae of other things, how can grammar and music serve as differentiae? Perhaps in the sense that minds may be distinguished as grammatical and musical, especially if the qualities are innate, in which case they do become specific differentiae.

It remains to decide whether there can be any differentia derived from the genus to which the differentiated thing belongs, or whether it must of necessity belong to another genus? The former alternative would produce differentiae of things derived from the same genus as the differentiae themselves- for example, qualities of qualities.

Virtue and vice are two states differing in quality: the states are qualities, and their differentiae qualities- unless indeed it be maintained that the state undifferentiated is not a quality, that the differentia creates the quality.

But consider the sweet as beneficial, the bitter as injurious:

then bitter and sweet are distinguished, not by Quality, but by Relation.We might also be disposed to identify the sweet with the thick, and the Pungent with the thin: "thick" however hardly reveals the essence but merely the cause of sweetness- an argument which applies equally to pungency.

We must therefore reflect whether it may be taken as an invariable rule that Quality is never a differentia of Quality, any more than Substance is a differentia of Substance, or Quantity of Quantity.

Surely, it may be interposed, five differs from three by two.

同类推荐
  • 新唐书

    新唐书

    本书为公版书,为不受著作权法限制的作家、艺术家及其它人士发布的作品,供广大读者阅读交流。汇聚授权电子版权。
  • 马致远元曲全集

    马致远元曲全集

    本书为公版书,为不受著作权法限制的作家、艺术家及其它人士发布的作品,供广大读者阅读交流。
  • 诸葛忠武书

    诸葛忠武书

    本书为公版书,为不受著作权法限制的作家、艺术家及其它人士发布的作品,供广大读者阅读交流。
  • 佛说长者施报经

    佛说长者施报经

    本书为公版书,为不受著作权法限制的作家、艺术家及其它人士发布的作品,供广大读者阅读交流。
  • 玄珠录

    玄珠录

    本书为公版书,为不受著作权法限制的作家、艺术家及其它人士发布的作品,供广大读者阅读交流。汇聚授权电子版权。
热门推荐
  • 天界地界

    天界地界

    讲述作者(常年华)三次西部行,看尽八万里路云和雪,历尽艰难险阻,阅尽醉人景色。作者以日记的形式讲述帕米尔高原无人居住区域、藏地至今尚未通车的墨脱县,以及那些遥远、路险、常人很难去的那些地方的所见、所听、所感。《天界地界(两疆穿行八万里)》是一本文化旅游读本,对于向往西藏、新疆旅游的读者起着向导作用。
  • 八闽魅力:福建文化特色与形态

    八闽魅力:福建文化特色与形态

    本书主要指福建文化特色与形态。包括历史传说文化遗产远古文化历史文化思想文化艺术文化民俗文化等,其中图文并茂,图解图注,形象直观,赏心悦目,彩色制作,丰富多彩,设计精美,格调高雅,非常适合广大读者阅读和珍藏,也非常适合各级图书馆装备和陈列。
  • 冠盖京华:嚣狂四小姐

    冠盖京华:嚣狂四小姐

    她是太傅府苏四小姐,亦是凰门会幕后杀主。官拜齐燕国御林大将军,手掌百万铁血雄兵,顽劣大义!当十数载男儿身被揭破,却原来这人儿——绝色无双、冠盖满京华!当朝太子,芝兰玉树;新朝暴君,腹黑狡猾。他爱她宠她疼她护她惯着她;他要她恨她夺她针对她,他们倾尽一切,只为博红颜一笑!【宠文、强文、穿越古文!剧情别具一格,前期欢笑小清新,后期女主成长强大腹黑,男主们各种有爱。正剧,结局不会悲剧!】
  • 如果世界选择将我遗弃

    如果世界选择将我遗弃

    20岁的Z大学生苏浅突逢家变,痛不欲生,意外遇到有相同经历的明逸。两个被世界遗弃的孩子,能否依靠彼此把握自己幸福?“如果世界选择将我遗弃,我将选择转身,让那些悲痛的过往掩埋在时光的沙里。”这是一个关于治愈的故事,里面人物的悲欢离合或许在我们这个缺爱的时代里,每时每刻都有人在默默承受着。希望借由这个故事给生活在相同漩涡的人们一些生存下去的希望。因为时间会让一切都变好的,只要我们还好好地活着!谨以此书献给曾经无助且孤独的自己。感谢你在最难熬的时光里,未曾放弃过生的希望。
  • 帝噬九天

    帝噬九天

    少年先天混沌圣体,却无法修炼,家族被灭,被人追杀掉落深渊之中。于血棺中复活,为报灭族之仇,为复活自己的父母!追寻武道极致,君临九天!我要这世人,都阻挡不了我的脚步。我要这苍穹,掌控不了我的命运。九州之上战天魔,风起天下我为皇!——林风
  • 半面修罗

    半面修罗

    水遥宫,一对冒冒失失、满腔仇恨的兄妹闯进了这个神秘的组织。妄图揭开它一层层神秘的面纱。却不知自己的一举一动早已被盯。这表面上冰冷如霜的四人竟然藏有这么深的秘密。他们的命运将会如何?--情节虚构,请勿模仿
  • 皈依路上的孙猴子

    皈依路上的孙猴子

    古有孙伏伽,古来第一状元。今有丛山孙伏伽,可敢文武状元乎?
  • 英雄联盟之女神电竞

    英雄联盟之女神电竞

    不知道何时起,世人们给我们一个新的定义“撸妹”。妹子在和男朋友谈恋爱的时候,“撸妹”在和队员谈论战术;妹子在逛街的时候,“撸妹”在和队员网吧五连坐;妹子在和男朋友看电影的时候,“撸妹”在和队员一起看饼王弱风的最新视频。电竞是本无所谓有,无所谓无的。这正如地上的路,其实地上本没有路,走的人多了,也便成了路。有了这个须有虚无的电竞梦,就要不断的去追逐。这样,梦想才有可能实现。打自己的电竞,做别人的女神。
  • Hermann and Dorothea

    Hermann and Dorothea

    本书为公版书,为不受著作权法限制的作家、艺术家及其它人士发布的作品,供广大读者阅读交流。
  • 魔道公子不可思:天才驭兽妃

    魔道公子不可思:天才驭兽妃

    她是豪门千金,一夜穿越成为公主。天才之名,美丽傲娇,天资聪颖,倾国倾城,一个回眸便可颠倒天下。他是华王世子,魂皇之王。英俊潇洒,玉树临风,拥有至高无上的权利。“你若不离不弃,我必生死相依。”“天下城,陌上花,不及你回眸一笑无瑕。”永不分开的誓言,不离不弃的承诺,最后都在火焰中化作虚无。曾经说好要在一起的两人,却变得反目。当一个人被命运逼得绝望,当一个人被挚爱伤透了心,真的会噬心成魔……