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H/E was born in Aberdeen in 1760, and lived till 1842He became a Presbyterian minister in London, and a schoolmaster at Highgate and afterwards at Greenwich.He wrote a number of educational works of value, as " Etymology and Syntax of the English Language," and "Gymnasium sive Symbola Critica." He has two philosophical works, gone on "Philosophical Necessity," dated Newington Green, 1793, and another on "Natural Theology," in 1829.In the preface to the first of these works, he tells us {266} that he was initiated in the principles of moral science by Dr.Beattie;that when he was a student in divinity the question was debated in a theological society, " Is man a free or necessary agent? " that he was then attached to the libertarian system, and continued to be so till he read Priestley's " Illustrations; " and that he was confirmed in the change of view by Hartley's " Observations." He answers Gregory's argument and illustration quoted above: "This demonstration of the essayist's is founded in error.It proceeds on the supposition that the two motives are not directly but indirectly repugnant, which is obviously false;any reconciliation between them being absolutely impossible." " If a guinea is offered to carry a letter ten miles east, and another to carry a letter ten miles south;and if I know I cannot earn both; if I know also that by taking any intermediate road I shall receive nothing, --then my situation is precisely the same as if the directions, instead of being eastward and southward, had been to points diametrically opposite." He admits "that a necessarian, consistently with his principles, cannot feel that remorse which is founded on the conviction that he has acted immorally, and might have acted otherwise; but by the law of his nature he feels pain from that state of mind which is connected with a vicious conduct." "A necessarian should feel no remorse, no painful sentiment for any past action, as he knows it was necessary for general happiness."The opponents of necessity argue that these are the logical consequences of the system, in order to land it in a <reductio ad absurdum>: but scarcely any of the defenders have allowed this.It is evident that the necessity he expounds is very different from that of Edwards.His work on "Natural Theology" is a clear and judicious one.He argues that no metaphysical argument such as Clarke's, and no metaphysical principle such as Reid's common sense, can of itself prove the existence of God.The question is " Are or are there not conclusive proofs in the phenomena of nature that they must be productions of an intelligent author? " "Wherever we find order and regularity obtaining, either uniformly or in a vast majority of instances, where the possibilities of disorder are indefinitely numerous, we are justified in inferring from this an intelligent cause." He argues against materialism, and in favor of the immateriality of the soul