1.It proceeds on the method of observation, professedly and really.In this respect it is different from nearly all the philosophies which went before, from many of those which were contemporary, and from some of those which still linger among us.The method pursued in Eastern countries, in ancient Greece and Rome, in the scholastic times, and in the earlier ages of modern European speculation, had not been that of induction, either avowedly or truly.No doubt, speculators have been obliged in all ages and countries to make some use of facts, in the investigation of both mind and matter.But in the earlier theosophies, physiologies, and philosophies, they looked at the phenomena of nature merely as furnishing a starting-point to their systems, or a corroboration of them; and their inquiries were conducted in the dogmatic, or deductive, or analytic manner, explaining phenomena by assumed principles, or bringing facts to support theories, or resolving the complexities of the universe by refined mental distinctions.This spirit had been banished from physical science, first, by the great realistic awakening of the sixteenth century; then by the profound wisdom and far-sighted sagacity of Bacon; and, finally, by the discoveries of Newton and the establishment of the Royal Society of London.But it lingered for some ages longer in material science, from which it has not even yet been finally expelled.Bacon had declared, that his method was applicable to all other sciences as well as to the investigation of the material universe."Does any one doubt (rather than object)," says he, "whether we speak merely of natural philosophy or of other sciences also, such as logics, ethics, politics, as about to be perfected by our method?""We certainly," he replies, "understand all these things which have been referred to; and like as the vulgar logic, which regulates things by the syllogism, pertains not to the natural but all sciences, so ours, which proceeds by induction, embraces them all.For thus we would form a history and tables concerning anger, fear, modesty, and the like, as also examples of civil affairs, not omitting the mental emotions of memory, composition, division, judgment, and the rest, just as we form such of heat and cold, of light, vegetation, and such like." Sir Isaac Newton had said in his Optics: "And if natural philosophy in all its parts, by pursuing this method, shall at length be perfected, the bounds of moral philosophy will also be enlarged." But the employment of the method of induction in the study of the human mind was for ages slow, wavering, and uncertain.It has been asserted, that Descartes proceeded on the method of induction; but the statement has been made by metaphysicians who have never correctly apprehended the mode of procedure recommended by Bacon.Descartes does indeed appeal to profound ideas, which may be regarded as mental facts; but it is not by them to arrive at laws by a gradual generalization; it is rather to employ them as foundation-stones of his structure, which is reared high above them by the joint dogmatic and deductive method, and on the geometric and not the inductive plan.It has been averred that Hobbes proceeded on the method of his friend Bacon; but Hobbes nowhere professes to do so: his doctrine of the origin of civil government is a mere theory, and his system of the human mind and of morals is obtained by a very defective analysis, and in fact, is mainly borrowed from Aristotle, whose profounder principles he was incapable of appreciating.It cannot be denied that Locke does proceed very largely in the way of observation; but it is a curious circumstance that he nowhere professes to follow the method of induction; and his great work may be summarily represented as an attempt to establish by internal facts the preconceived theory, that all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection.To the Scottish school belongs the merit of being the first, avowedly and knowingly, to follow the inductive method, and to employ it systematically in psychological investigation.As the masters of the school were the first to adopt it, so they, and those who have borrowed from them, are almost the only persons who have studiously adhered to it.The school of Condillac in France, and its followers in England {4} and Germany, do indeed profess to attend to observation, but it is after the manner of the empiricists, described by Bacon as beginning with experience, but immediately abandoning it for premature hypotheses.It will be seen, as we advance, that Kant followed the critical and not the inductive method.
Hutcheson and Turnbull, and especially Reid and Stewart, have the credit of announcing unambiguously, that the human mind is to be studied exclusively by the method of observation, and of consistently employing this mode of procedure in all their investigations.
