The purpose of a work like the one under review cannot simply be desultory criticism of separate sections of political economy or the discussion of one or another economic issue in isolation.On the contrary，it is from the beginning designed to give a systematic résuméof the whole complex of political economy and a coherent elaboration of the laws governing bourgeois production and bourgeois exchange.This elaboration is at the same time a comprehensive critique of economic literature，for economists are nothing but interpreters of and apologists for these laws.
Hardly any attempt has been made since Hegel's death to set forth any branch of science in its specific inner coherence.The official Hegelian school had assimilated only the most simple devices of the master's dialectics and applied them to everything and anything，often moreover with ridiculous incompetence.Hegel's whole heritage was，so far as they were concerned，confined exclusively to a template，by means of which any subject could be knocked into shape，and a set of words and phrases whose only remaining purpose was to turn up conveniently whenever they experienced a lack of ideas and of concrete knowledge.Thus it happened，as a professor at Bonn has said，that these Hegelians knew nothing but could write about everything.
The results were，of course，accordingly.For all their conceit these gentlemen were，however，sufficiently conscious of their failings to avoid major problems as far as possible.The superannuated fossilised type of learning held its ground because of its superior factual knowledge，and after Feuerbach's renunciation of the speculative method，Hegelianism gradually died away，and it seemed that science was once more dominated by antiquated metaphysics with its rigid categories.
For this there were quite natural reasons.The rule of the Hegelian Diadochi，which ended in empty phrases，was naturally followed by a period in which the concrete content of science predominated once more over the formal aspect.Moreover，Germany at the same time applied itself with quite extraordinary energy to the natural sciences，in accordance with the immense bourgeois development setting in after 1848；with the coming into fashion of these sciences，in which the speculative trend had never achieved any real importance，the old metaphysical mode of thinking，even down to the extreme triviality of Wolff，gained ground rapidly.Hegel was forgotten and a new materialism arose in the natural sciences；it differed in principle very little from the materialism of the eighteenth century and its main advantage was merely a greater stock of data relating to the natural sciences，especially chemistry and physiology.The narrow-minded mode of thinking of the pre-Kantian period in its most banal form is reproduced by Büchner and Vogt，and even Moleschott，who swears by Feuerbach，frequently flounders in a highly diverting manner through the most simple categories.The jaded cart-horse of the commonplace bourgeois mind falters of course in confusion in front of the ditch separating substance from appearance，and cause from effect；but one should not ride carthorses if one intends to go.coursing over the very rough ground of abstract reasoning.
In this context，therefore，a question had to be solved which was not connected with political economy as such.Which scientific method should be used？There was，on the one hand，the Hegelian dialectics in the quite abstract "speculative"form in which Hegel had left it，and on the other hand the ordinary，mainly Wolffian，metaphysical method，which had come again into vogue，and which was also employed by the bourgeois economists to write their bulky rambling volumes.The second method had been theoretically demolished by Kant and particularly by Hegel so that its continued use in practice could only be rendered possible by inertia and the absence of an alternative simple method.The Hegelian method，on the other hand，was in its existing form quite inapplicable.It was essentially idealist and the main point in this case was the elaboration of a world outlook that was more materialist than any previous one.Hegel's method took as its point of departure pure thought，whereas here the starting point was to be inexorable facts.A method which，according to its own avowal，"came from nothing through nothing to nothing"was in this shape by no means suitable.
It was，nevertheless，the only element in the entire available logical material which could at least serve as a point of origin.It had not been subjected to criticism，not been overthrown；none of the opponents of the great dialectician had been able to make a breach in the proud edifice.
It had been forgotten because the Hegelian school did not know how to apply it.Hence，it was first of all essential to carry through a thorough critique of the Hegelian method.
