It was notorious that the English ambassador in Washington had morethan once correctly informed him of the inevitable consequence ofthe English policy.If Mr Huskisson had really been the man thatpeople in other countries supposed him to be, he would have madeuse of the publication of the American tariff as a valuableopportunity for making the English aristocracy comprehend the follyof their corn laws, and the necessity of abolishing them.But whatdid Mr Huskisson do? He fell into a passion with the Americans (orat least affected to do so), and in his excitement he madeallegations -- the incorrectness of which was well known to everyAmerican planter -- and permitted himself to use threats which madehim ridiculous.Mr Huskisson said the exports of England to theUnited States amounted to only about the sixth part of all theexports of England, while the exports of the United States toEngland constituted more than half of all their exports.From thishe sought to prove that the Americans were more in the power of theEnglish than the latter were in that of the former; and that theEnglish had much less reason to fear interruptions of trade throughwar, cessation of intercourse, and so forth, than the Americanshad.If one looks merely at the totals of the value of the importsand exports, Huskisson's argument appears sufficiently plausible;but if one considers the nature of the reciprocal imports andexports, it will then appear incomprehensible how Mr Huskissoncould make use of an argument which proves the exact opposite ofthat which he desired to prove.All or by far the greater part ofthe exports of the United States to England consisted of rawmaterials, whose value is increased tenfold by the English, andwhich they cannot dispense with, and also could not at once obtainfrom other countries, at any rate not in sufficient quantity, whileon the other hand all the imports of the North Americans fromEngland consisted of articles which they could either manufacturefor themselves or procure just as easily from other nations.If wenow consider what would be the operation of an interruption ofcommerce between the two nations according to the theory of values,it will appear as if it must operate to the disadvantage of theAmericans; whereas if we judge of it according to the theory of theproductive powers, it must occasion incalculable injury to theEnglish.For by it two-thirds of all the English cottonmanufactories would come to a standstill and fall into ruin.
England would lose as by magic a productive source of wealth, theannual value of which far exceeds the value of her entire exports,and the results of such a loss on the peace, wealth, credit,commerce, and power of England would be incalculable.What,however, would be the consequences of such a state of things forthe North Americans? Compelled to manufacture for themselves thosegoods which they had hitherto obtained from England, they would inthe course of a few years gain what the English had lost.No doubtsuch a measure must occasion a conflict for life and death, asformerly the navigation laws did between England and Holland.Butprobably it would also end in the same way as formerly did theconflict in the English Channel.It is unnecessary here to followout the consequences of a rivalry which, as it appears to us, mustsooner or later, from the very nature of things, come to a rupture.
What we have said suffices to show clearly the futility and dangerof Huskisson's argument, and to demonstrate how unwisely Englandacted in compelling the North Americans (by means of her corn laws)to manufacture for themselves, and how wise it would have been ofMr Huskisson had he, instead of trifling with the question by suchfutile and hazardous arguments, laboured to remove out of the waythe causes which led to the adoption of the American tariff of1828.
In order to prove to the North Americans how advantageous tothem the trade of England was, Mr Huskisson pointed out theextraordinary increase in the English importations of cotton, butthe Americans also knew how to estimate this argument at its truevalue.For the production of cotton in America had for more thanten years previously so greatly exceeded the consumption of, andthe demand for, this article from year to year, that its prices hadfallen in almost the same ratio in which the export had increased;as may be seen from the fact that in the year 1816 the Americanshad obtained for 80,000,000 pounds of cotton 24,000,000 dollars,while in the year 1826 for 204,000,000 pounds of cotton they onlyobtained 25,000,000 dollars.
Finally, Mr Huskisson threatened the North Americans with theorganisation of a wholesale contraband trade by way of Canada.Itis true that under existing circumstances an American protectivesystem can be endangered by nothing so seriously as by the meansindicated by Mr Huskisson.But what follows from that? Is it thatthe Americans are to lay their system at the feet of the EnglishParliament, and await in humility whatever the latter may bepleased to determine from year to year respecting their nationalindustry? How absurd! The only consequence would be that theAmericans would annex Canada and include it in their Union, or elseassist it to attain independence as soon as ever the Canadiansmuggling trade became unendurable.Must we not, however, deem thedegree of folly absolutely excessive if a nation which has alreadyattained industrial and commercial supremacy, first of all compelsan agricultural nation connected with her by the closest ties ofrace, of language, and of interest, to become herself amanufacturing nation, and then, in order to hinder her fromfollowing the impulse thus forcibly given to her, compels her toassist that nation's own colonies to attain independence?
