Critique of Pure Reason, trans.Müller, 11, 515-17.Hume also: " When, after the simple conception of anything, we would conceive it as existent, we in reality make no addition to, or alteration of, our first idea.Thus, when we affirm that God is existent, we simply form the idea of such a being as He is represented to us; nor is the existence which we attribute to Him conceived by a particular idea, which we join to His other qualities, and can again separate and distinguish from them....The belief of the existence joins no new idea to those which compose the ideas of the object.When I think of God, when I think of Him as existent, and when I believe Him to be existent, my idea of Him neither increases nor diminishes.But as 'tis certain there is a great difference betwixt the simple conception of the existence of an object and the belief of it, and as this difference lies not in the facts or compositions of the idea which we conceive.it follows that it most lie in the manner in which we conceive it." (Treatise of Human Nature.pt.iii.sec.7.)
I use the notion of the Ego here, as common-sense uses it.Nothing is prejudged as to the results (or absence of results)
of ulterior attempts to analyze the notion.
Griesinger, Mental Diseases, §§
50, 98.The neologism we so often hear, that an experience 'gives us a realizing sense ' of the truth of some proposition or other, illustrates the dependence of the sense of reality upon excitement.Only what stirs us is 'realized.'
The way in which sensations are pitted against systematized conceptions, and in which the one or the other then prevails according as the sensations are felt by ourselves or merely known by report, is interestingly illustrated at the present day by the state of public belief about 'spiritualistic' phenomena.There exist numerous narratives of movement without contact on the part of articles of furniture and other material objects, in the presence of certain privileged individuals called mediums.Such movement violates our memories, and the whole system of accepted physical 'science.' Consequently those-who have not seen it either brand the narratives immediately as lies or call the phenomena' illusions' of sense, produced by fraud or due to hallucination.But one who has actually seen such a phenomenon, under what seems to him sufficiently 'test-conditions,'
will hold to his sensible experience through thick and thin, even though the whole fabric of 'science' should be rent in twain.That man would be a weak-spirited creature indeed who should allow any-blown generalities about 'the liability of the senses to be deceived' to bully him out of his adhesion to what for him was an indubitable experience of sight.a man may err in this obstinacy, sure enough, in any particular case.But the spirit that animates him is that on which ultimately the very life and health of Science rest.
Treatise of Human Nature, bk.I.pt.III.
Early Hist.of Mankind, p.108.
C See Vol.I.pp.285-8; Vol.II.pp.237
ff.
See Theory of Vision, § 59.
Classics editors note: James' Insertion Essay, bk.rv.chap.2.§ 14.In another place: " He that sees a candle burning and hath experimented the force of its flame by putting his finger into it, will little doubt that this is something existing without him, which does him harm and puts him to great pain....And if our dreamer pleases to try whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy by putting his hand into it, he may.perhaps, be awakened into a certainty greater than he could wish, that it is something more than bare imagination.So that the evidence is as great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain, i.e.happiness or misery; beyond which we have no concernment, either of knowledge or being.Such an assurance of the existence of things without us is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good and avoiding the evil which is caused by them, which is the important concernment we have of being made acquainted with them." (Ibid.bk.iv.chap.11, § 8.)
Bagehot, 'The Emotion of Conviction,' Literary Studies, I.412-17.
Psychologie Rationnelle, ch.12.
Two examples out of a thousand:
Reid, Inquiry, ch.ii § 9: "I remember, many years ago, a white ox was brought into the country, of so enormous size that people came many miles to see him.There happened, some months after, an uncommon fatality among women in child-bearing.Two such uncommon events, following one another, gave a suspicion of their connection, and occasioned a common opinion among the country people that the white ox was the cause of this fatality."
H.M.Stanley, Through the Dark Continent, ii.388: "On the third day of our stay at Mowa feeling quite comfortable amongst the people, on account of their friendly bearing, I began to write in my note-book the terms for articles, in order to improve my already copious vocabulary of native words.
I had proceeded only a few minutes when I observed a strange commotion amongst the people who had been flocking about me, and presently they ran sway.In a short time we heard war-cries ringing loudly and shrilly over the table-land.Two hours afterwards a long line of warriors were seen descending the table-land and advancing towards our camp.There may have been between five and six hundred of them.We, on the other hand, had made but few preparations except such as would justify us replying to them in the event of the actual commencement of hostilities.But I had made many firm friends among them and I hardly believed that I should be able to avert an open rupture.When they had assembled at about a hundred yards in front of our camp, Safeni and I walked up towards them and sat down midway.Some half-dozen of the Yowa people came near, and the shauri began.,'
" 'What is the matter, my friends?' I asked.'Why do you come with guns in your hands, in such numbers, as though you were coming to fight? Fight?
