Shall we then (proceeded Socrates) write the letter R on this side, and on that side the letter W; and then anything that appears to us to be the product of righteousness we will place to the R account, and anything which appears to be the product of wrong-doing and iniquity to the account of W?
The letter R (to stand for Right, Righteous, Upright, Just). The letter W (to stand for Wrong, Unrighteous, Unjust).
By all means do so (he answered), if you think that it assists matters.
Accordingly Socrates drew the letters, as he had suggested, and continued.
Soc. Lying exists among men, does it not? Euth. Certainly.
To which side of the account then shall we place it? (he asked). Euth. Clearly on the side of wrong and injustice.
Soc. Deceit too is not uncommon? Euth. By no means.
Soc. To which side shall we place deceit? Euth. Deceit clearly on the side of wrong.
Soc. Well, and chicanery or mischief of any sort?
Reading {to kakourgein} (= furari, Sturz); al. {kleptein}, Stob. Euth. That too.
Soc. And the enslavement of free-born men?
Or, "the kidnapping of men into slavery." {to andrapodizesthai} = the reduction of a free-born man to a state of slavery. Slavery itself ({douleia}) being regarded as the normal condition of a certain portion of the human race and not in itself immoral.
Euth. That too.
Soc. And we cannot allow any of these to lie on the R side of the account, to the side of right and justice, can we, Euthydemus?
It would be monstrous (he replied).
Soc. Very good. But supposing a man to be elected general, and he succeeds in enslaving an unjust, wicked, and hostile state, are we to say that he is doing wrong?
Euth. By no means.
Soc. Shall we not admit that he is doing what is right? Euth. Certainly.
Soc. Again, suppose he deceives the foe while at war with them? Euth. That would be all fair and right also.
Soc. Or steals and pillages their property? would he not be doing what is right?
Euth. Certainly; when you began I thought you were limiting the question to the case of friends.
Soc. So then everything which we set down on the side of Wrong will now have to be placed to the credit of Right?
Euth. Apparently.
Soc. Very well then, let us so place them; and please, let us make a new definition--that while it is right to do such things to a foe, it is wrong to do them to a friend, but in dealing with the latter it behoves us to be as straightforward as possible.
Or, "an absolutely straightforward course is necessary." I quite assent (replied Euthydemus).
So far so good (remarked Socrates); but if a general, seeing his troopsdemoralised, were to invent a tale to the effect that reinforcements were coming, and by means of this false statement should revive the courage of his men, to which of the two accounts shall we place that act of fraud?
Cf. "Hell." IV. iii. 10; "Cyrop." I. vi. 31. On the side of right, to my notion (he replied).
Soc. Or again, if a man chanced to have a son ill and in need of medicine, which the child refused to take, and supposing the father by an act of deceit to administer it under the guise of something nice to eat, and by service of that lie to restore the boy to health, to which account shall we set down this fraud?
Euth. In my judgment it too should be placed to the same account.
Soc. Well, supposing you have a friend in deplorably low spirits, and you are afraid he will make away with himself--accordingly you rob him of his knife or other such instrument: to which side ought we to set the theft?
Euth. That too must surely be placed to the score of right behaviour.
Soc. I understand you to say that a straightforward course is not in every case to be pursued even in dealing with friends?
Heaven forbid! (the youth exclaimed). If you will allow me, I rescind my former statement.
See above, I. ii. 44 ({anatithemai}).
Soc. Allow you! Of course you may--anything rather than make a false entry on our lists. . . . But there is just another point we ought not to leave uninvestigated. Let us take the case of deceiving a friend to his detriment: which is the more wrongful--to do so voluntarily or unintentionally?
Euth. Really, Socrates, I have ceased to believe in my own answers, for all my former admissions and conceptions seem to me other than I first supposed them. Still, if I may hazard one more opinion, the intentional deceiver, I should say, is worse than the involuntary.
Or, "all my original positions seem to me now other than I first conceived them"; or, "everything I first asserted seems now to be twisted topsy-turvy."Soc. And is it your opinion that there is a lore and science of Right andJustice just as there is of letters and grammar?
{mathesis kai episteme tou dikaiou}--a doctrine and a knowledge of the Just.
Euth. That is my opinion.
Soc. And which should you say was more a man of letters--he who intentionally misspells or misreads, or he who does so unconsciously?
Or, "more grammatical"; "the better grammarian."Euth. He who does so intentionally, I should say, because he can spell or read correctly whenever he chooses.
Soc. Then the voluntary misspeller may be a lettered person, but the involuntary offender is an illiterate?
Or, "In fact, he who sins against the lore of grammer intentionally may be a good grammarian and a man of letters, buthe who does so involuntarily is illiterate and a bad grammarian?"Euth. True, he must be. I do not see how to escape from that conclusion.
Soc. And which of the two knows what is right--he who intentionally lies and deceives, or he who lies and deceives unconsciously?
Or, Soc. And does he who lies and deceives with intent know what is right rather than he who does either or both unconsciously?
Euth. Clearly he does.
Euth. The intentional and conscious liar clearly.
Soc. Well then, your statement is this: on the one hand, the man who has the knowledge of letters is more lettered than he who has no such knowledge?
Or, Soc. It is a fair inference, is it not, that he who has the{episteme} of grammar is more grammatical than he who has no such{episteme}?
Euth. Yes.
