Let it be supposed, that there is no other kind of causality than that according to the laws of nature.Consequently, everything that happens presupposes a previous condition, which it follows with absolute certainty, in conformity with a rule.But this previous condition must itself be something that has happened (that has arisen in time, as it did not exist before), for, if it has always been in existence, its consequence or effect would not thus originate for the first time, but would likewise have always existed.The causality, therefore, of a cause, whereby something happens, is itself a thing that has happened.Now this again presupposes, in conformity with the law of nature, a previous condition and its causality, and this another anterior to the former, and so on.If, then, everything happens solely in accordance with the laws of nature, there cannot be any real first beginning of things, but only a subaltern or comparative beginning.There cannot, therefore, be a completeness of series on the side of the causes which originate the one from the other.But the law of nature is that nothing can happen without a sufficient a priori determined cause.The proposition therefore- if all causality is possible only in accordance with the laws of nature- is, when stated in this unlimited and general manner, self-contradictory.It follows that this cannot be the only kind of causality.
From what has been said, it follows that a causality must be admitted, by means of which something happens, without its cause being determined according to necessary laws by some other cause preceding.That is to say, there must exist an absolute spontaneity of cause, which of itself originates a series of phenomena which proceeds according to natural laws- consequently transcendental freedom, without which even in the course of nature the succession of phenomena on the side of causes is never complete.
ANTITHESIS.
There is no such thing as freedom, but everything in the world happens solely according to the laws of nature.
PROOF.
Granted, that there does exist freedom in the transcendental sense, as a peculiar kind of causality, operating to produce events in the world- a faculty, that is to say, of originating a state, and consequently a series of consequences from that state.In this case, not only the series originated by this spontaneity, but the determination of this spontaneity itself to the production of the series, that is to say, the causality itself must have an absolute commencement, such that nothing can precede to determine this action according to unvarying laws.But every beginning of action presupposes in the acting cause a state of inaction; and a dynamically primal beginning of action presupposes a state, which has no connection- as regards causality- with the preceding state of the cause- which does not, that is, in any wise result from it.Transcendental freedom is therefore opposed to the natural law of cause and effect, and such a conjunction of successive states in effective causes is destructive of the possibility of unity in experience and for that reason not to be found in experience- is consequently a mere fiction of thought.
We have, therefore, nothing but nature to which we must look for connection and order in cosmical events.Freedom- independence of the laws of nature- is certainly a deliverance from restraint, but it is also a relinquishing of the guidance of law and rule.For it cannot be alleged that, instead of the laws of nature, laws of freedom may be introduced into the causality of the course of nature.For, if freedom were determined according to laws, it would be no longer freedom, but merely nature.Nature, therefore, and transcendental freedom are distinguishable as conformity to law and lawlessness.
The former imposes upon understanding the difficulty of seeking the origin of events ever higher and higher in the series of causes, inasmuch as causality is always conditioned thereby; while it compensates this labour by the guarantee of a unity complete and in conformity with law.The latter, on the contrary, holds out to the understanding the promise of a point of rest in the chain of causes, by conducting it to an unconditioned causality, which professes to have the power of spontaneous origination, but which, in its own utter blindness, deprives it of the guidance of rules, by which alone a completely connected experience is possible.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE THIRD ANTINOMY.
ON THE THESIS.
