SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF MIND -- (CONTINUED) MORAL ASPECT OF THE ORGANIC VIEW -- IT IMPLIES THAT REFORMSHOULD BE BASED ON SYMPATHY -- USES OF PRAISE AND BLAME -- RESPOSIBILITYBROADENED BUT NOT LOST -- MORAL VALUE OF A LARGER VIEW -- ORGANIC MORALITYCALLS FOR KNOWLEDGE -- NATURE OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONSo far as the moral aspect is concerned， it should be the result of this organic view of mind to make the whole teaching and practice of righteousness more rational and effectual by bringing it closer to fact. A moral view which does not see the individual in living unity with social wholes is unreal and apt to lead to impractical results.
Have not the moral philosophies of the past missed their mark， in great part， by setting before the individual absolute standards of behavior， without affording him an explanation for his backwardness or a programme for his gradual advance ？ And did not this spring from not discerning clearly that the moral life was a social organism， in which every individual or group of individuals had its own special possibilities and limitations ~ In general such systems， pagan and Christian， have said， "All of us ought to be so and so， but since very few of us are， this is evidently a bad world." And they have had no large， well-organized， slow-but-sure plan for making it better. Impracticable standards have the same ill effect as unenforcible law； they accustom us to separate theory from practice and make a chasm between the individual and the moral ideal.
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The present way of thinking tends to close up this chasm and bring both persons and ideals into more intelligible relations to real life. The sins or virtues of the individual？ it seems？ are never fortuitous or disconnected； they have always a history and collateral support， and are in fact more or less pleasing phases of a struggling， aspiring whole.
The ideals are also parts of the whole； states of being， achieved momentarily by those in front and treasured for the animation and solace of all. And the method of righteousness is to understand as well as may be the working of this whole and of all its parts， and to form and pursue practicable ideals based on this understanding. It is always to be taken for granted that there is no real break with history and environment. Each individual may be required to put forth a steadfast endeavor to make himself and his surroundings better， but not to achieve a standard unconnected with his actual state. And the same principle applies to special groups of all sorts， including nations， races， and religions； their progress must be along a natural line of improvement suggested by what they are. We are thus coming under the sway of that relative spirit， of which， says Walter Pater， "the ethical result is a delicate and tender justice in the criticism of human life." [1]
According to this， real reform must be sympathetic； that is， it must begin， not with denunciation梩hough that may have its uses梑ut with an intimate appreciation of things as they are， and should proceed in a spirit opposite to that in which we have commonly attacked such ques (15)-tions as the suppression of intemperance and the conversion of the heathen.
Human nature， it appears， is very much the same in those we reckon sinners as in ourselves. Good and evil are always intimately bound up together； no sort of men are chiefly given over to conscious badness；and to abuse men or groups in the large is unjust and generally futile.
As a rule the practical method is to study closely and kindly the actual situation， with the people involved in it； then gradually and carefully to work out the evil from the mixture by substituting good for it. No matter how mean or hideous a man's life is， the first thing is to understand him；to make out just how it is that our common human nature has come to work out in this way. This method calls for patience， insight， firmness， and confidence in men， leaving little room for the denunciatory egotism of a certain kind of reformers. It is more and more coming to be used in dealing with intemperance， crime， greed， and in fact all those matters in which we try to make ourselves and our neighbors better. I notice that the most effectual leaders of philanthropy have almost ceased from denunciation.
Tacitly assuming that there are excuses for everything， they "shun the negative side " and spend their energy in building up the affirmative.
This sort of morality does not， however， dispense with praise and blame， which are based on the necessity of upholding higher ideals by example， and discrediting lower ones. All such distinctions get their meaning from their relation to an upward-striving general life， wherein conspicuous men serve as symbols through which the higher (16) structure may be either supported or undermined.
We must have heroes， and perhaps villains (though it is better not to think much about the latter)， even though their performances， when closely viewed， appear to be an equally natural product of history and environment. Tn short it makes a difference whether we judge a man with reference to his special history and " lights，" or to the larger life of the world； and it is right to assign exemplary praise or blame on the latter ground which would be unwarranted on the former. There is certainly a special right for every man； but the right of most men is partial， important chiefly to themselves and their immediate sphere； while there are some whose right is representative， like that of Jesus， fit to guide the moral thought of mankind； and we cherish and revere these latter because they corroborate the ideals we wish to hold before us.
