The individual is already there.The moral and the legal sanctions are 'external';something imposed by the action of others;corresponding to 'coercion,'whether by physical force or the dread of public opinion;and,in any case,an accretion or addition,not a profound modification of his whole nature.The Utilitarian 'man'therefore inclines to consider other people as merely parts of the necessary machinery.Their feelings are relevant only as influencing their outward conduct.If a man gives me a certain 'lot'of pain or pleasure,it does not matter what may be his motives.The 'motive'for all conduct corresponds in all cases to the pain or pleasure accruing to the agent.It is true that his happiness will be more or less affected by his relations to others.But as conduct is ruled by a calculation of the balance of pains or pleasures dependent upon any course of action,it simplifies matters materially,if each man regards his neighbour's feelings simply as instrumental,not intrinsically interesting.And thus the coincidence between that conduct which maximises my happiness and that conduct which maximises happiness in general,must be regarded as more or less accidental or liable in special cases to disappear.
If I am made happier by action which makes others miserable,the rule of utility will lead to my preference of myself.
Here we have the question whether the Utilitarian system be essentially a selfish system.Bentham,with his vague psychology,does not lay down the doctrine absolutely.After giving this list of self-regarding 'springs of action,'he proceeds to add the pleasures and pains of 'sympathy'and 'antipathy'which,he says,are not self-regarding.Moreover,as we have seen,he has some difficulty in denying that 'benevolence'is a necessarily moral motive:it is only capable of prompting to bad conduct in so far as it is insufficiently enlightened;and it is clear that a moralist who makes the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number'his universal test,has some reason for admitting as an elementary pleasure the desire for the greatest happiness.This comes out curiously in the Constitutional Code.He there lays down the 'self-preference principle'--the principle,namely,that 'every human being'is determined in every action by his judgment of what will produce the greatest happiness to himself,'whatsoever be the effect.in relation to the happiness of other similar beings,any or all of them taken together.'(117)Afterwards,however,he observes that it is 'the constant and arduous task or every moralist'and of every legislator who deserves the name to 'increase the influence of sympathy at the expense of that of self-regard and of sympathy for the greater number at the expense of sympathy for the lesser number.'(118)He tries to reconcile these views by the remark 'that even sympathy has its root in self-regard,'and he argues,as Mr Herbert Spencer has done more fully,that if Adam cared only for Eve and Eve only for Adam --neither caring at all for himself or herself --both would perish in less than a year.Self-regard,that is,is essential,and sympathy supposes its existence.Hence Bentham puts himself through a catechism.(119)What is the 'best'government?That which causes the greatest happiness of the given community.What community?
'Any community,which is as much as to say,every community.'But why do you desire this happiness?Because the establishment of that happiness would contribute to my greatest happiness.And how do you prove that you desire this result?By my labours to obtain it,replies Bentham.This oddly omits the more obvious question,how can you be sure that your happiness will be promoted by the greatest happiness of all?What if the two criteria differ?
I desire the general happiness,he might have replied,because my benevolence is an original or elementary instinct which can override my self-love;or I desire it,he would perhaps have said,because I know as a fact that the happiness of others will incidentally contribute to my own.The first answer would fall in with some of his statements;but the second is,as I think must be admitted,more in harmony with his system.Perhaps,indeed,the most characteristic thing is Bentham's failure to discuss explicitly the question whether human action is or is not necessarily 'selfish.'He tells us in regard to the 'springs of action'that all human action is always 'interested,'but explains that the word properly includes actions in which the motive is not 'self-regarding.'(120)It merely means,in fact,that all conduct has motives.The statement which I have quoted about the 'self-preference'principle may only mean a doctrine which is perfectly compatible with a belief in 'altruism'--the doctrine,namely,that as a fact most people are chiefly interested by their own affairs.The legislator,he tells us,should try to increase sympathy,but the less he takes sympathy for the 'basis of his arrangements'--that is,the less call he makes upon purely unselfish motives --the greater will be his success.(121)This is a shrewd and,I should say,a very sound remark,but it implies --not that all motives are selfish in the last analysis,but --that the legislation should not assume too exalted a level of ordinary morality.The utterances in the very unsatisfactory Deontology are of little value,and seem to imply a moral sentiment corresponding to a petty form of commonplace prudence.(122)Leaving this point,however,the problem necessarily presented itself to Bentham in a form in which selfishness is the predominating force,and any recognition of independent benevolence rather an incumbrance than a help.
